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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT, PART I 
THE FUTURE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
Tom Ginsburg* 
 
Welcome to the Law and Development blog symposium!  We are 
thrilled to have a fantastic array of participants lined up and trust that the 
discussion will be lively.  In our call for participation, we asked people to 
reflect on the diverse conceptions of ―law and development‖ and to take the 
opportunity to think about the directions the field is headed.  I would like to 
begin by posing three questions for consideration, though I anticipate that 
we may end up heading in quite different directions as well. 
First, as an initial question, is Law and Development really a field?  In 
a recent paper, Brian Tamanaha argues that Law and Development is ―a 
poorly constructed category that lacks internal coherence . . . .  Law and de-
velopment work is better seen, instead, as an agglomeration of projects per-
petuated by motivated actors supported by funding.‖1  Much depends, of 
course, on what we mean by a field.  As a field of applied activity, Law and 
Development seems to have a clear boundary involving reform projects re-
lated to legal institutions.  As a scholarly field, however, it may be less 
clear.  On the one hand, we have two nascent journals, the Law and Devel-
opment Review and the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, which is surely 
one sign of the institutionalization of a scholarly field.  On the other hand, 
one might argue that there is sufficient lack of consensus on method and 
topic to deserve the title ―field.‖  But if not a field, what is it? 
Second, what, if anything, have we already learned about the topic?  It 
is canonical in discussing Law and Development to hearken back to the first 
(or second, depending how you count) law and development movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s.  It is also canonical to point out that we are now see-
ing activity on a much larger scale than ever before, with perhaps billions of 
dollars spent in aggregate on projects touching the area each year.  Many ar-
ticles in the field today essentially repeat Trubek and Galanter’s 1970s cri-
 
 
 
*
  Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
1
  Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development 6 (St. 
John’s Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-0172, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1406999 (link). 
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tique of the misconceptions of all this work.2  But we surely have developed 
more sophisticated tools for understanding development outcomes since the 
1960s, even if many of these tools (particularly cross-country measures of 
institutional quality) are highly contested.  What do we know that we did 
not know ten years ago?  What is the best Law and Development research?  
Perhaps one way of framing the latter question is to ask: if you had to sug-
gest that someone outside Law and Development read only two or three re-
cent articles, what would they be? 
Third, where should our attention go in the future?  Are some scholarly 
and practical approaches more or less promising?  Some institutions more 
or less deserving of study and/or reform?  Surely there are lively debates 
over what constitute best practices, the design of development assistance, 
how to measure the rule of law, and the very possibility of institutional 
change.  The tent does not seem to be folding, notwithstanding many con-
cerns about the relationship between legal reform and development out-
comes. 
I’ve asked more questions than can be answered.  Let’s see what our 
bloggers have to say. 
 
 
 
2
  See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (describing con-
ceptual and practical failures of the Law and Development movement). 
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THE ALCHEMY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
Salil Mehra* 
 
At the heart of Law and Development currently sits a dilemma stem-
ming from the relationship between activity and study.  Tom Ginsburg has 
kicked off this discussion with three questions that helpfully frame this 
problem. 
To his three questions, I would add a fourth.  Specifically, how does 
the relationship between Law and Development and the alphabet soup of 
rule-of-law promoting organizations (IMF, WTO, ICN, OECD, World 
Bank), to which Ginsburg and Brian Tamanaha3 point, provide benefits to 
Law and Development as an academic enterprise?  That Law and Develop-
ment is disproportionately a collection of sponsored projects—a critique 
that could be aimed to some degree at other fields also—should not prevent 
us from asking how Law and Development’s interaction with these interna-
tional organizations imposes an externally driven logic.  
The costs of this relationship, on the other hand, are well-known to the 
participants in this symposium.  Of particular detriment is the tendency for 
Law and Development scholars to focus on issues that would make for rep-
licable ―tools‖ and ―best practices‖ that could be readily transplanted.  For 
example, the empirically driven attraction of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (―LLSV‖) to the 
IMF and World Bank,4 and the resulting focus of the field on their ―law 
matters‖ thesis, suggests how Law and Development can be consumed by 
the search for a development Philosopher’s Stone that will lead to the com-
pletion of a new millennium Great Work.  
We can observe another example of this tendency in competition law, 
particularly in the work of the International Competition Network (ICN), 
which focuses on competition advocacy.5  This group does a great job of ga-
thering information about the differing abilities and approaches of national 
competition enforcement agencies in order to provide competition-based 
critiques of government policy and to enlist civil society in constructing a 
competition culture in their nations.  But the ICN is, at times, inordinately 
 
 
 
*
  James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law, sme-
hra@temple.edu.  Thanks Tom and Danny for graciously hosting this discussion and inviting me to con-
tribute a brief comment to this online discussion hosted by the Northwestern University Law Review 
Colloquy.  And apologies in advance for the alchemical references.  All errors and omissions are mine.   
3
  See Tamanaha, supra note 1, at 2. 
4
  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) 
(link); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (link); Rafael La Porta et 
al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 4714 (1999) (link).  All three pieces analyze the 
relationship between ―legal families,‖ such as the English common law family and the French civil law 
family, and investment outcomes.  
5
  See Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International An-
titrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 105–116 (2007). 
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focused on building a toolkit of best practices—something that may not be 
appropriate when the contexts in which these agencies are embedded often 
differ substantially from one another.  A really great hammer (though it 
might work, despite some damage) is not so great when faced with a screw.  
There is a real risk that the academic field of Law and Development can be-
come similarly obsessed with what comparativists might call applied func-
tionalism. 
I think that there is a way forward for Law and Development that in-
volves embracing and addressing differences rather than seeking a universal 
solvent.  By taking this path, Law and Development’s close link with its 
sponsors can prove to be a benefit. Recently, I had the fortune to hear Elea-
nor Fox speak.  She discussed ways we might think about the differences in 
context and in endowments that different competition agencies find them-
selves with, and pointed out that it can be useful to simply understand and 
appreciate these differences in order to better manage conflicts with each 
other and with other institutions.6  In a similar vein, Lan Cao has written 
about the need for Law and Development to address embedded cultural 
practices and institutions, rather than taking them as a given, as tends to 
happen now.7  Together, Fox’s and Cao’s views provide a path whereby 
Law and Development, rather than focusing on universal tools that may be 
stymied by varying cultures and institutions, can try to build models and 
endorse practices that embrace these differences.  These differences can 
then either be accounted for in the translation of ―best practices‖ or be made 
themselves into objects of development reform.  That is, at least, one vision 
for the future of Law and Development, though perhaps it is an ambitious 
one. 
 
 
 
6
  See ABA Section on Antitrust, Panel Discussion: The International Competition Network, Moving 
Forward with a New Chair and New Challenges (Jul. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-bb/audio/09/AT90701.mp3 (link). 
7
  See Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (2007) (link). 
104:164 (2009) Future of Law & Development, Part I 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/37/:aw.nort 168 
THERE IS NO SINGLE FIELD OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
Katharina Pistor* 
 
Let me begin—following Ohnesorge8 following Trubek and Santos9—
with the notion that the concepts of ―law and development‖ and ―rule of 
law‖ are closely intermingled with the process of legal reform in developing 
countries and the role foreign advisers and multilateral institutions play in 
that undertaking.  Describing the ―field‖ in this fashion reveals that the glue 
that holds together a set of disparate activities by disparate actors (for under 
what other circumstances do we assume common ground between family 
and securities lawyers, or professors and world bankers?) is a shared belief 
in the virtue of law. 
The beauty of the ―law and development‖ ideal and the ―rule of law‖ 
ideal is that hardly anybody can disagree with the goal of building a neutral 
and universally accessible institutional framework that is meant to benefit 
all people irrespective of race, gender, social status, or membership in a par-
ticular clan or group.  This unity of purpose also means that academics and 
policy advisers across the political spectrum can join forces.  When re-
sources are constrained, we do not have to discuss whether political reforms 
should precede economic reforms, whether land reform supersedes invest-
ments in infrastructure, or whether educational or health reforms should 
take precedence over building stock markets or establishing antitrust agen-
cies.  Instead, we can all promote legal development reforms based on the 
assumption that building a sound legal system will ultimately further all of 
the above.  Studies indicating a strong correlation between the ―rule of law‖ 
and economic growth appear to buttress that assumption.10 
Obviously, however, correlations do not prove causation.  And it is 
disconcerting that we lack a sound theoretical basis for explaining why the 
correlation between legal development and economic growth holds across 
some countries, but breaks down in others.  Nor do we have a good handle 
on why legal reforms frequently fail to deliver the expected results and, 
sometimes, correlate to events the opposite of those anticipated.11  In short, 
 
 
 
*
  Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
8
  John Ohnesorge, ―Beijing Consensus‖ Anyone?, in Symposium: The Future of Law and Develop-
ment, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY (forthcoming 2009). 
9
  THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Al-
varo Santos eds., 2006). 
10
  See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995); Daniel Kaufmann 
et al., Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004 (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3630, 2005) (link). 
11
  For a general critique of the lack of theory and empirics in the field of Law and Development, see 
Trubek & Galanter, supra note 2.  On the failure of wholesale law reform projects to enhance the levels 
of rule of law in transplant countries, see Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 163 (2003). 
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we continue to know very little about the political economy of legal reforms 
and their distributional effects.  If we believe strongly enough that good law 
creates a win-win situation whereby today’s losers will tomorrow happily 
join today’s winners without dethroning them, we need not bother.  But be-
liefs do not add up to an academic field—and for good reason. 
Take, for example, the relation between the ―rule of law‖ and the status 
of women in society.  The status of women in society can serve as a heuris-
tic device. Women represent the systematically disenfranchised: they can be 
found in all societies, and all societies tend to discriminate against women, 
or at least share a legacy of discriminating against them.12  On their face, the 
ideals that underpin legal reform efforts13 suggest that women should bene-
fit from the rule of law as an alternative to entrenched social norms.  Yet 
closer inspection reveals that in most parts of the world there is at best a 
weak correlation between the status of women in society and the ―rule of 
law,‖ notwithstanding comprehensive law reform efforts to advance their 
rights.14 
But this example may not prove much.  Indeed, one might argue that, 
with some patience, law will eventually benefit women in countries around 
the globe.  However, unless we have a sound theory that suggests under 
what conditions women actually do gain from specific legal reforms and in 
what ways, this strategy condemns us to an ―invisible hand‖15 approach. 
Just as advocates of free markets assume that market forces will ulti-
mately achieve the most efficient outcome, so too advocates of rule of law 
reforms assume that they will ultimately serve the best outcome.  Yet nei-
ther markets nor legal rules are ends in themselves—ultimately, both serve 
broader social goals.  Only with a clearer understanding of what these ends 
ought to be can we begin to disentangle the relation between specific legal 
reform efforts and the social and economic indicators used to assess and 
measure the legal reform effort.  And it is only with better goal identifica-
tion that we can begin to appreciate alternatives to law that may achieve 
similar social and economic outcomes, the acknowledgement of which 
brings us squarely back to the Critical Legal Studies debates of the 1970s.  
 
 
 
12
  According to the Gender Gap index, even a country like Sweden discriminates against women.  
See Katharina Pistor et al., Social Norms, Rule of Law, and Gender Reality: An Essay on the Limits of 
the Dominant Rule of Law Paradigm, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 241–278 (James 
J. Heckmann et al. eds., 2009). 
13
  Most central is the ideal of ―the rule of law.‖  For a critical review of this concept as a foundation 
for data collection efforts, see Melissa Thomas, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Meas-
ure?, EUR. J. DEV. RES. (2009), http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/ejdr/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/ejdr200932a.html (link).  Another crucial ideal is ―free-
dom.‖  See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).  However, Nussbaum makes the im-
portant point that a general reference to freedom is not enough.  See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities 
as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 35 (2003).  Instead, Nuss-
baum advocates a list of substantive freedoms.  Id. at 40–42. 
14
  Pistor, supra note 12, Fig. 11.3, at 251. 
15
  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: BOOKS IV–V 32 (Penguin Books 1999) (1776). 
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Accordingly, perhaps it is time to concede that there is no single field of 
Law and Development. Instead, there are multiple disciplines that share a 
common interest in the comparative development of (legal) institutions in 
societies at different income levels. 
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LAW & DEVELOPMENT NARROW AND LAW & DEVELOPMENT BROAD 
Anna Gelpern* 
 
I confess an embarrassing aversion to existence debates, one likely 
born of slogging through too many first chapters of International Law text-
books (―Is It Law?‖) and straining hard to care.  If we argue long enough 
about whether Law and Development is a field, a subfield, a project, or a 
collection of projects, it will surely become field-ish enough soon enough.  
And Brian Tamanaha has done as much as anyone to shape the field, such 
as it might be, beginning with his marvelous early work on legal transplants 
in Micronesia.16  Thus I am all for marching forward on the assumption that 
there is or soon will be a field of Law and Development, and focusing on 
Tom’s second and third questions, which go to what we want this field to 
look like. 
The day’s financial upheaval offers a fine opportunity to rethink what 
Law and Development should be.  I suggest two options, Law and Devel-
opment Narrow, and Law and Development Broad. 
Law and Development Narrow would continue refining our knowledge 
of the relationship between law and economic growth in the applied Law 
and Economics vein (more context sensitivity, more/better empirical stu-
dies), and broadening our view of the law’s role in human development 
(better incorporating ―the social‖17).  It would also press on with the sociol-
ogy/ethnography/political economy of legal technical assistance, including 
institutional studies. 
Law and Development Narrow has the virtue of definability, and the 
foundation of history, doctrine, and critique, from Trubek & Galanter18 to 
Trubek & Santos.19  But it can become self-limiting.  At worst, it will be the 
study of legal technical assistance, the inoffensive ninth ―deliverable‖ at 
every international summit, thrice outsourced to and by bilateral develop-
 
 
 
*
  Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. 
16
  See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, UNDERSTANDING LAW IN MICRONESIA:  AN INTERPRETIVE 
APPROACH TO TRANSPLANTED LAW (1993). 
17
  See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Develop-
ment Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 9, at 1, 7–8; Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and 
Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 9, at 203, 203–252 (describing the re-
cent move by international financial institutions to redefine development beyond economic growth, and 
considering the appropriate progressive response).   For Duncan Kennedy, writing in the same volume, 
―The Social‖ defines the second wave of globalization in law and legal thought (1900–1968), which 
marked a ―rethinking [of] law as a purposive activity, as a regulatory mechanism that could and should 
facilitate the evolution of social life in accordance with greater perceived social interdependence at 
every level . . . .‖  Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850—2000, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 9, at 19, 22. 
18
  See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 2. 
19
  See THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 9. 
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ment agencies and multilateral development banks.  Since we, law profes-
sors from the erstwhile center, ultimately get the consultancy, it might look 
important—but does anyone outsource the nukes, exchange rates, or struc-
tural adjustment?  Even in the more ―holistic‖ vision of Law and Develop-
ment Narrow, we are the legal department to development economists 
(assume the most respectable, say Stiglitz and Sen20), and marginal critics to 
Jim Wolfensohn’s Comprehensive Development Framework.21  Law and 
Development Narrow toils nobly in the institutional trenches, glad at the in-
cremental improvement it might prod in the human condition—but can we 
reach farther, particularly as an (ahem) academic field?  
Law and Development Broad is disturbingly amorphous.  It takes from 
the Law and Development work done so far a rare and valuable perspective, 
a view of the relationship between law and economics from what was until 
recently the political and economic periphery.  It takes the empiricism inhe-
rent in legal reform projects, the trove of qualitative and quantitative studies 
of legal transplants, the theories of legal pluralism, and the politics of post-
colonial law reform.  And, like Trubek & Santos, it takes the institutional 
studies, but it does not use a brand of existing development institutions to 
delimit the field. 
Law and Development Broad is perfectly placed to respond to the lat-
est cataclysm of financial integration, whose epicenter happens to be in 
New York and London, precisely because it saw it all before in Manila, 
Moscow, Lagos, and Buenos Aires.  The past year has brought a slew of 
Egg-on-Our-Faces reports from the traditional providers of legal technical 
assistance, a parade of Regulators-in-Self-Estrangement confessionals.22  
Turns out our own law and development were not all they could be.  But 
 
 
 
20
  Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen are both Nobel Prize-winning development economists. 
21
  The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) was launched in 1998 by then-World Bank 
President James Wolfensohn and represented the latest move to expand the remit of development policy 
to incorporate the social, cultural, and political context of developing countries, and a broader range of 
stakeholders.  See The World Bank, Comprehensive Development Framework, www.worldbank.org/cdf/ 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2009) (link).  For background, see SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD’S BANKER: A 
STORY OF FAILED STATES, FINANCIAL CRISES, AND THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (2004). 
22
  See, e.g., THE GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 13 (2009),  http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf (link); FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 11 
(2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (link); THE DE LAROSIERE GROUP, THE 
HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU: REPORT 6 (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (link); UNCTAD 
SECRETARIAT TASK FORCE ON SYSTEMIC ISSUES AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC CRISIS: SYSTEMIC FAILURES AND MULTILATERAL REMEDIES 1 (2009), 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gds20091_en.pdf (link); UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
OF EXPERTS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON REFORMS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 5 (2009), 
http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf (link).  These are just a few exam-
ples of the many reports by ad-hoc and standing international bodies describing the causes and conse-
quences, and recommending responses to, the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
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because financial integration is real, ―our‖ law has an immediate and dra-
matic impact on ―their‖ development, and, increasingly, vice versa.23  This 
observation is not new, but feels much more obvious today than it did even 
a few years ago.24  We cannot apologize and pack up; we need ―them‖ to 
keep buying Treasury bills.  The unequivocal directionality that defined 
Law and Development, which Brian highlights in his latest essay,25 fits 
awkwardly with the ascendance of the G20, BRIC summitry, global imbal-
ances, and, as John points out in his blog post, the could-be Beijing Con-
sensus (will Beijing want a consensus in its name?).26   
Law and Development Broad, then, is in a privileged position relative 
to many more established fields to tell the complicated story of law and in-
tegration, law and interpenetration, law and plural, multilevel, relational 
governance.  It knows of power, of institutions, and of practice far beyond 
funded law reform.  It has been through public and private, and is not easily 
bewitched by either.  It is intensely self-aware, but has moved past navel-
contemplation.  And it knows that bringing together law and human devel-
opment, richly defined, demands untold amounts of humility, personal and 
intellectual commitment for the long haul.  I could live with such a field—
or call it what you will. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23
  This is, arguably, at least part of the story of the financial crises of 1982 and 1998. 
24
  The moderately diverse G20 squeezing out the hopelessly Eurocentric G8 as the preeminent fo-
rum for global economic coordination is only the latest example of institutional shifts supporting this 
proposition.  See, e.g., The Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders’ Statement ¶ 19, at 3 (2009), 
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/documents/organization/129853.pdf (mentioning the inclusion of ma-
jor emerging economies in the new Financial Stability Board) (link).  
25
  Tamanaha, supra note 1, at 28–30.  The standing critique of Law and Development, which his es-
say adopts, sees it as a vehicle for exporting a particular view of the law, its contents, and its relationship 
to economics, from the center to the periphery.  Id. at 31–38. 
26
   See Ohnesorge, supra note 8. 
